Value objectivists like myself tend to think of practical reasoning as the process by which an agent forms beliefs about what things have value, and then organizes those beliefs in order to act in a way that makes sense in light of them. But suppose you are skeptical about objective value – how, in that case, do you understand practical reasoning?
We find one way of understanding it in Harry Frankfurt’s recent work (especially in The Reasons of Love). On Frankfurt’s view, the roots of practical reason are not cognitive but volitional: rather than detecting things’ pre-existing values, we give them value by caring about them. Love, which represents the deepest form of caring, sets the limits to practical reasoning; it is in light of what one loves that one’s actions must make sense. Love, then, has a special importance for human agency. It also has a special value for human beings: for according for Frankfurt, loving things makes a person’s life better, by making it meaningful.
The claim that practical reason may be grounded in love, or caring, might be an attractive picture for people whose sympathies are broadly Humean. And the claim that love enhances the value and meaningfulness of one’s life might be attractive to many objectivists (including myself). The question though, is: can Frankfurt have both? In fact there is, I think, a conflict between Frankfurt’s views about what makes a person’s life better, and his claims about the value of love.
Here are the claims. (In the interest of space, I’m leaving out the textual support for attributing these claims to Frankfurt.)
(G) The value of A’s life is enhanced or damaged by the fact that P if and only if P is something that A actually cares about, or if the fact that P somehow has an enhancing or damaging effect on other matters that A cares about.
(L) In itself, the fact that a person loves something makes that person’s life better than it would otherwise be.
(G) sets the criteria which a consideration must meet if it is to be judged relevant to the goodness of a person’s life. (L) claims that a certain sort of consideration – that a person’s life contains instances of loving – is reliably relevant to the goodness of that person’s life. We should expect, then, that loving should meet the criteria set forth in (G). But is this indeed the case?
It is easy to see that this is not the case. For suppose there is an agent (call her Apathetic) who does not love or care about anything. Since Apathetic does not care about anything, the fact that she does not care about anything is not something that she cares about; nor does the fact that she does not care about anything affect anything that she cares about. Thus, the fact that Apathetic does not care about anything does not meet the criteria set forth in (G). I assume, however, that most of us would agree with Frankfurt’s judgment (expressed in claim (L)) that the fact that Apathetic does not care about anything makes her life worse than it might otherwise be. Thus, (G) seems to be false: in at least some cases the fact that a person’s life is P can damage the value (to her) of that life, even though she neither cares about P, nor about anything that is affected by P.
Apathetic is unusually apathetic, of course, but she is in no sense a conceptual impossibility. Of course, it is presumably true that an enlightened Apathetic, who was somehow in a position to appreciate the damage that the absence of love was doing to Apathetic’s life, would care about this failure to care. But for Frankfurt to make use of this possibility would be to open the door to all kinds of objective values. If the fact that a more enlightened Apathetic would not be apathetic about her own life is allowed to generate reasons for action, why should the fact that a genuinely enlightened Apathetic would care about other people’s lives not be allowed to generate (moral) reasons for action in a similar manner?
The point can also be made with a less extreme example. Suppose that Selfless, unlike Apathetic, does care about something: the welfare of her children, perhaps. It does not follow that Selfless must care about the caring itself. Suppose that Selfless is truly selfless and cares only for the welfare of her children. Given the choice between a situation in which her children flourish, but she no longer cares about them, and a situation in which her children suffer, but she continues to care (and thus regrets that they suffer), she would without hesitation choose the former state of affairs. As it happens, this is not her situation: the best way to ensure that her children flourish is to make certain that she is there to protect them, and she therefore regards the preservation of her own life as valuable – but only instrumentally valuable.
Selfless’s life, unlike Apathetic’s, has a purpose. Her life is therefore presumably better than Apathetic’s life. Does it follow that she must care about the caring that gives her life a purpose? Not unless she also cares about whether her life has a purpose, and Selfless is too selfless for that. She would, perhaps, prefer that her children’s lives were purposeful, since she wants them to be as well off as possible. She might therefore hope that her children find something to care about, the way that she has. But none of this implies that Selfless must care about the fact that she herself cares about her children – despite the fact that this does make her life better.
Thus, Frankfurt’s claims about the intrinsic value of loving, while correct, show (G) to be false. Loving is not only an intrinsic value but a kind of objective value: it tends to make a person’s life better whether he cares about it or not. The true issue separating Frankfurt from traditional moral objectivists is not whether there are objective values, but rather which objective values there actually are.
Just a reminder that the 2005 meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology is June 9-12 at Wake Forest and the program is complete. Most relevant to this blog, there is an invited session on The Psychology of Free Will with talks by psychologists Jonathan Schooler, Kathleen Vohs, & Azim Shariff (UBC) and Jordan Peterson (Toronto) and by philosophers Shaun Nichols (who is also giving an invited lecture) & Joshua Knobe, who will be discussing their experimental philosophy work on free will and moral responsibility. Bob Kane is the session’s commentator.
Also of interest (I hope), I’ve put together a panel discussion on Mind and Brain in the Media to discuss the role the media plays in presenting research that influences people’s conception of human nature, free will, etc. and hence affects important ethical and legal debates. What role do (and should) academic philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists play in shaping the folk’s conception of themselves? Panel members include Owen Flanagan, Paul Bloom, Daniel Povinelli, and Dan Lloyd. I’m still looking for a science journalist to join us–any ideas? Hope to see you at the conference.
PEA Brain Dave Shoemaker, paraphrasing his colleague, Steve Wall, suggested only half in jest that all philosophers who are sports fans really want to write about philosophy of sports. Being accurately pegged, here is some sports ethics.
In particular, amidst all the brouhaha over steroid use in baseball, I’ve been wondering whether anabolic steroid use in sports is morally permissible. I’ll first provide some very brief background information about anabolic steroids and a few guiding assumptions. I’ll then mention some of the standard arguments against the use of anabolic steroids in sports, and finally, some responses to these arguments. Unhappily, and at the risk of siding with Jose Canseco and being labeled as someone who doesn’t understand the "purity" of sports, I think I find the responses to the standard objections convincing. I’m hoping some of you can get me back on the straight and narrow.
Here is some brief background information, which I’m taking from this informative and readable .pdf from the NSW Health Department). Anabolic steroids are drugs derived from the male hormone testosterone. They are used by some athletes to enhance muscle mass (and, therefore, an athlete’s speed and strength) and tissue repair (and, therefore, an athlete’s recovery between workouts and competitions). Thus, anabolic steroids, like Human Growth Hormone (HGH) (and multi-vitamins and caffeine, for that matter), are a kind of performance enhancing drug. They are usually effective only when used in combination with extensive training and workouts. Side effects in men range from jaundice, baldness, and aggression to various heart problems, infertility, diabetes, and permanent liver damage. Side effects in women are similar, and also include development of a deep voice and increased facial hair. The extent of these side effects differ for each individual user, but most side effects are minimized with low dosages of these drugs, and most side effects stop when an individual stops using them. For these and a number of other reasons, use of anabolic steroids is taken to be morally impermissible and is prohibited in almost every sport and at every competitive level (i.e., professional, Olympic, collegiate, scholastic, and youth). I will assume in this post that all that I have described is true. I will also limit the discussion to professional and "world-class amateur" competitions, such as the Olympics and World Championships in various events.
Here are some standard arguments against the use of anabolic steroids in, as I see it, increased order of strength. Let’s call the first argument The Argument from Unnaturalness (AU). The general form of this argument is the following: use of anabolic steroids in sports is unnatural; therefore, use of anabolic steroids ought to be prohibited. If this argument means (AU1) "anabolic steroids are unnatural substances, therefore use of them ought to be prohibited," it is not sound, since the explicit premise is false and the assumed premise unjustified. The explicit premise is false, since anabolic steroids are derived from the male hormone testosterone, which is of course a natural substance. On this criterion, there would seem to be no more reason to prohibit anabolic steroids than, say, Gatorade or multi-vitamins. The assumed premise, ‘use of unnatural substances ought to be prohibited’, also seems unjustified, since it seems absurd to think that, for example, football helmets and nautilus equipment, both unnatural "substances," ought to be prohibited. If the arguments means (AU2): "the athletes who use anabolic steroids are unnatural or abnormal; therefore use of these substances ought to be prohibited," it is also not sound, since the assumed premise, ‘if the athletes who use anabolic steroids are abnormal or unnatural, then use of anabolic steroids ought to be prohibited’ seems unjustified. Of course the athletes who use these drugs are unnatural or abnormal, though they are so simply in virtue of being able to perform feats that few of us can perform. Sometimes this argument is taken to indicate something about the purity of sports (AU3): "the nature of sports is that it is a competition to determine which athlete has developed, through hard work, dedication, persistence, and the other athletic virtues, his or her skills to the utmost; however, use of anabolic steroids allows those who use them to win competitions without developing his or her skills to the utmost; therefore, use of these drugs ought to be prohibited." But the second premise is false. Use of anabolic steroids, like use of multi-vitamins, does not enable one to become Superathlete. These drugs work, to the extent that they do, only when combined with hard work, dedication, persistence, and the exercise of other athletic virtues. (Moreover, as I’ll discuss below, the first premise leaves out the athletic virtue of performing gracefully under increased risk, which, when included in the first premise, makes the second premise more suspect.)
But if the nature of sports is that it is a competition to determine which athlete has developed his or her skills to the utmost, perhaps use of anabolic steroids frustrates such a determination, since the user/hard worker may have an unfair advantage over the mere hard worker. Let’s call this second standard argument against the use of anabolic steroids the Argument from Unfair Advantage (AUA). The general form of this argument is the following: use of anabolic steroids gives the user an unfair advantage over non-users; therefore, use of them ought to be prohibited. Sometimes, it is thought that the premise is true, simply because the user is violating the rules, thereby gaining an unfair advantage over those who do not. Leaving aside the issue of whether one who violates rules always has an unfair advantage over those who do not, the point at issue is whether use of anabolic steroids ought to be considered a violation of the rules. That is, the issue is whether or not use of anabolic steroids ought to be prohibited, not whether they are in fact prohibited. A different reason to think that the premise is true is that, if use of anabolic steroids were allowed, athletes who would use them would have an advantage over those who would not. This might be true, but it does not itself tell us why that would be an unfair advantage. It is permissible in professional sports for an athlete to get daily massages in order help her muscles recover more quickly, and this athlete has an advantage over an athlete who, because of a lack of finances or unfortunate geographic location, cannot receive daily massages. But it is not clear why this fact alone means that the first athlete has an unfair advantage over the second—or, at least it is not clear why this fact alone means that the first athlete does not have an unfair advantage that is sufficient to warrant a prohibition against daily massages.
Perhaps what is driving (AUA) is a version of a third argument, which we’ll call the Argument from Harm (AH): use of anabolic steroids causes harm; therefore, use of anabolic steroids ought to be prohibited. Different versions of this argument depend on who or what is harmed by use of steroids. According to (AH1): "use of anabolic steroids harms the user; therefore, use of anabolic steroids ought to be prohibited." There are actually two different issues here, one empirical and one theoretical. The empirical issue is the amount of harm, especially physical, that accrues to the user. In keeping with the background information, I will assume that some harm accrues to the user, though it seems far from clear that the harm is anywhere near a level that should be sufficient for prohibiting its use. It doesn’t seem unreasonable to assume that more harm actually accrues to the user just being involved in his or her sport than it does in using anabolic steroids. Think of all the injuries in football, hockey, boxing, rock climbing, and, yes, even baseball. Is the harm from use of anabolic steroids worse than the harm got from simply participating in these sports? At any rate, suppose a good deal of harm results from use of anabolic steroids. We are still left with the theoretical issue of paternalism. Surely, adult competitors understand the risks involved in using anabolic steroids, just as a wide receiver understands the risks of breaking his neck when going up to receive a high pass, and just as a baseball player understands the risks of being beaned in the head by a Roger Clemens fastball, and just as a boxer understands the risks of being repeatedly pounded in the head by a flurry of his opponent’s punches. There seems to be an element of hypocrisy in claiming that use of steroids ought to be prohibited on paternalistic grounds, while allowing high receptions in football, high inside fastballs in baseball, and head punches in boxing.
There are other versions of (AH), including (AH2): use of anabolic steroids harms those who do not use them; therefore, use of anabolic steroids ought to be prohibited. If what is meant by the premise is that users have an unfair advantage over non-users, then this argument is actually (AUA). But, sometimes what is meant is something like the following: users’ anabolic steroid use coerces non-users into using anabolic steroids, and thereby coerces non-users into doing something unnecessarily harmful simply to "keep up"." I have sympathy for this argument, but it is still not clear to me that this argument is sufficiently forceful to prohibit use of anabolic steroids. It is undoubtedly true that when some athletes do something that enhances their performance, others are, in some sense, "coerced" into doing that same thing to keep up–including some things that are harmful. But it is not clear that this constitutes harm that is sufficient to prohibit the practice that started the rat race. For example, I think it is safe to assume that there have been innumerable physical harms that have accrued to athletes in weight rooms throughout the years, simply because athletes have to do extensive weight training in order to "keep up." But such risk does not seem sufficient to prohibit athletes from engaging in weight training. To take another example, it is imperative these days that world-class runners retreat for months at a time to high-elevation areas to train. Doing so enhances their performance, and those who do not retreat for long periods to the mountains have little hope of defeating those who do. And, sometimes, retreating for long periods of time to high altitude, usually mountainous, areas can be quite harmful, if not physically (which it can be, especially if one trains at altitude too hard, too early), then often times emotionally and personally. I personally know couples who have divorced and families that have broken up because a runner had to spend months each year in a mountainous location, far away from his family. But it seems absurd to think that high altitude training ought to be prohibited because some athletes feel "coerced" into doing that. Moreover, in some sports, it seems that the virtues of risk-taking and physical sacrifice, brought on by advances in technology, is vital to the competition. Consider sports such as skiing, luge, race car driving, and rock-climbing, in which advances in technology "force" upon athletes increased risk. In these sports, performance in the midst of increased risk-taking is to admired. It is not clear why it should be different in, say, baseball, football, and track and field.
A third version of (AH) is (AH3): use of anabolic steroids at the professional level harms children and teenagers; therefore use of anabolic steroids ought to be prohibited. The premise is supposed to be true, because many children and teens view professional athletes as role models. And it is one thing to allow adults to do something harmful to themselves, but it is quite another to allow them to do something harmful when children and teens are likely to emulate them. Again, I have some sympathy with this argument, but the assumed premise seems patently false: ‘if youngsters are likely to be harmed by doing something athletes do, then athletes ought to be prohibited from doing it." Most athletes engage in extensive weight training, which can be quite harmful when engaged in by youngsters; many athletes engage in premarital sex, which can be quite harmful when engaged in by youngsters; many athletes engage in alcohol consumption, which can be quite harmful when engaged in by youngsters; some athletes drive automobiles close to 200 mph, which can be quite harmful when engaged in by youngsters. But surely athletes ought not be prohibited from engaging in any of these activities, simply because harm could come to youngsters who also engage in them.
So, these are some standard arguments against the use of anabolic steroids. I think the responses to these objections are actually convincing, but I confess that I don’t really want to go where the argument leads: use of anabolic steroids in professional and world-class athletics is morally permissible.
I met geneticist and evo-devo guru Wallace Arthur at the University of Chicago in the late 1980s, where he spent some time during a sabbatical. He had begun dissenting from standard neo-Darwinian theory, and was running new ideas about evolution by scientific audiences. In the years since, Arthur’s books and articles have featured a steady stream of provocative ideas, plainly expressed.
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